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. Rogov: In my opinion, the Russian-American relations are not bad today. Maybe, their state is the best in the last century or even in the whole history. However, it does not mean that they are ideal. We are talking here about two countries that so far either interacted too little (except times of the great world upheavals) or were rivals, as in the second half of the 20th century.
There should be at least three major factors for establishing a true partnership: the availability of common interests, common values as well as common institutions and mechanisms. Russia and the U.S. repeatedly shared their interests starting with America’s war for independence and its civil war; then came WWI and, of course, WWII. When a common enemy emerged – first, Great Britain, then, Germany and, later on, Germany and Japan – the fundamental differences in the political and ideological systems did not prevent Russia and the U.S. from becoming allies. But this did not turn out to be enough for a genuine partnership. As soon as their common goal, like the victory in WWII, was reached, the ideological differences came to the forefront again.
In the 20th century there appeared a common interest of the fundamentally different kind: to prevent a mutual annihilation in a nuclear war. It resulted in introducing an arms control, i.e. in fact, a regulation of rivalry between mortal enemies, whose instinct of self-preservation makes it imperative to work out rules of the arms race so as to keep it under control and more or less bearable economically.
In the years before Russia’s restructuring there were practically no other common interests and, naturally, no proper mechanisms. Only after 1991, when Russia set a task of building a democratic market-economy society, a possibility of sharing common values emerged. However, I cannot state definitely that everything is perfectly all right in this respect. The reason is that our reforms are still far from being completed and, besides, they were being implemented with serious mistakes. Apparently, it will take quite a few years before the Russian democracy gets mature and the market evolves into being the civilized one. Nevertheless, it seems that there is no tough ideological confrontation: Russia is no longer a communist scarecrow to the U.S. just as the U.S. is in no way a monster of imperialism to us.
A possibility of partnership by no means implies that it may be realized automatically. The strategic partnership, which was declared by the elder George Bush and Boris Yeltsin in 1991, virtually did not come about. In this respect, some of the slogans being used by the current U.S. president and Vladimir Putin, to a considerable extent, sound like a repetition of the past. But prerequisites for their realization are significantly better now. And this is because of the fact that after September 11, as Americans acknowledge, the common enemy, international terrorism, has emerged. So, we have at least one factor available to develop a strategic partnership. That is our common interests. Besides, there is also such an important moment as personal contacts and ties between the two presidents.

Eurasian Metals: In what directions is the development of the partnership relations between the two countries more real and more important?

A: With respect to the military political sphere, today the most urgent task is not an arms control that rather relates to negative moments but agreements on what should not be done or, to be even more precise, on what we will do together in confronting our common enemy. It makes a certain positive contribution to our relationship. Essentially, these are relations of the allied or quasi-allied kind. I think that it is still not realistic to set a task of conducting joint military operations taking into account the fact that the international terrorism, our common enemy, has a specific nature unlike, say, Hitler’s Germany. But the emergence of new nuclear states, which lack the skills and experience of controlling nuclear arms, is fraught with danger of their involvement in some hot conflicts, for example, in Kashmir. Theoretically, by getting involved in a conflict they can, for the first time since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, use nuclear weapons. Besides, it cannot be ruled out that international terrorists are capable of getting access to weapons of mass destruction. In my opinion, precisely in this respect some major positive shifts in the relations between Russia and the U.S. may take place in the nearest future.
This has also been confirmed by the recent summit of the G-8 leaders that has proved a significant rapprochement in relations not only between our two countries but between other summit participants as well. The task of establishing a complete control over the nuclear cycle is getting more real. That is the control over all aspects of production and utilization of nuclear materials and technologies, which can be used by terrorist organizations to make the so-called ‘dirty bomb’. Of course, there are a lot of unclear moments with respect to accomplishing this task, since today it is just impossible to hide technical details of the nuclear technology. Figuratively speaking, there is no way to put the genie back in the bottle. But now appears a chance to make a new bottle at least, a bottle of a bigger size and with less pressure on its cork. To this end it is necessary to secure appropriate changes in the international law and its new interpretation. In particular, it has become known that there is an illegal international network of selling nuclear materials, its center being in Pakistan. In order to liquidate such a nuclear underground, a modification of the international law will be required.
Obviously, there are other common tasks as well. For example, in case of a terrorist attack the localization and neutralization of its aftereffects are needed. And here the practical experience of Russia’s Ministry for Emergency Situations might be of help: it has advanced mobile laboratories, hospitals, equipment, means of transportation. There are similar systems in the U.S. and, except our two countries, no one in the world does have such a powerful machinery to liquidate consequences of global-scale catastrophes. Russia and the U.S. could provide assistance to any country in case of an ecological or man-caused disaster like the one that 20 years ago cost several dozens of thousands of lives in India at Union Carbide’s chemical mill.
Other forms and types of the cooperation are also a possibility. The U.S. shows the anxiety towards North Korea and Iran, which, in its opinion, are capable of making nuclear weapons and means of their delivery. This is particularly the reason for creating a new missile defense system, which, in fact, will be directed at countries that already possess such weapons. So, if components of such systems against Iran (that, in my opinion, will not be able to get nuclear weapons very soon, if ever) are to be deployed in countries of Eastern Europe, then, it obviously cannot but cause concern on our part. At the same time, Russia geographically is much closer to new nuclear countries than the U.S. That is why, instead of creating new missile defense systems, which could result in Russia’s concern, it would be better to develop a mutually advantageous cooperation in this sphere, would it not? For example, Russia participates in it by providing its available missile defense ground information systems and the U.S. does the same with respect to its space-deployed systems. Probably, there might be a kind of integration of missile defense information components. It is well known that our groups of satellites are technically outdated and that financial resources for their renewal are limited. At the same time, the U.S. has a rather limited arsenal of interceptors: those same Patriot-3 missiles. Russia, on the contrary, possesses more efficient interceptors. If we go further, then, our countries could cooperate in developing advanced means of interception and a missile defense information component. If this takes place, it will send a strong warning signal to all countries that are either developing or planning to develop nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes.

Q: How real is such a partnership?

A: So far these issues have not been worked over conceptually either in Russia or in the U.S. So, the question arises: why such important problems still have not been studied and have not been scientifically substantiated in a proper way? And the answer is: not only because of tenacious psychological consequences of the Cold War. Of much more importance is what Americans call the nuclear position, including the composition and structure of nuclear forces, the system of combat training, plans of deployment and use. The nuclear planning in the U.S. and Russia virtually has not changed: like 30 years ago, both countries are ready to strike each other with a disarming pre-emptive blow in a matter of a few minutes. Do not you agree that you cannot become strategic partners while having war plans against each other?

Q: And, generally speaking, does it make any sense to plan a nuclear war in the changed conditions?

– To this end it is necessary to overcome enormous inertia of the system that had been forming for decades. Let me give you an example of how strong such an inertia can be. Great Britain is considered the U.S. closest ally but the U.S. latest strategic plan called Rainbow-4 and directed against Great Britain, which was regarded as enemy No.1 since America’s war for independence, was adopted in…1935!
By 95% the nuclear forces of Russia and the U.S. are solely meant for the use in a war against each other. Yes, it is true that a number of warheads was reduced: there were 12,000 to 15,000 of them; now there are about 6,000 of them and, under the Moscow Treaty, there will be 2,200 warheads or approximately two warheads per each strategic target. Except the U.S., no other country has so many targets.
However, the nuclear containment is not only a military might but it is also a matter of policy and psychology. Fortunately enough, they can be changed. If this task is successfully accomplished, then, a certain movement to the strategic partnership with the U.S. will become real.

Q: It is clear that a strategic partnership also assumes the developed economic relations that reach the stage of a certain interdependence. In your opinion, are there any significant changes in the economic ties between our two countries?

A: Today the American economy can do without Russia quite well, except supplies of some raw materials. But, probably, it cannot be called an economic interdependence. By the way, even in the hardest years of the Cold War the U.S. was buying from Russia some strategic materials that were on the most secret lists.
Among the U.S. economic partners Russia is ranked 42d or 43d, between Nicaragua and Panama. At the same time, we have witnessed how the economic interdependence between the U.S. and China has emerged practically from zero. And it has become a powerful stabilizing factor in their relationship despite the enormous ideological contradictions and the Taiwan problem. Maybe, we better use China’s experience as well and create conditions for a strategic partnership. Taking into account the state of our economy it will take at least 20 to 30 years. We need to complete market-economy reforms, to spur up the process of technological renovation, to continue moving towards establishing a mature democracy.

Q: In what spheres our economic contacts could be the most promising ones?

A: As far as an interdependence is concerned, I think that it is, above all, the sphere of energy security in view of the enormous extent of energy consumption in the U.S. economy. Russia could really cover no less than 10% to 15 % of its demand. Not at once, of course, but stage by stage, since it requires colossal investments in the fuel-and-energy complex as well as a strong political support. These ideas have already been discussed but the YUKOS case has hampered the dialogue.

Q: How would you comment on the well-known restrictions with respect to Russian export shipments of steel to the U.S.?

A: There are two contradictory moments in the American approach. In the first place, it goes without saying that American consumers are interested in getting cheaper goods and services of higher quality from all the countries of the world. So, it is no wonder that the U.S. trade deficit reaches $500B. At the same time, however, the U.S. administration should demonstrate a highly sympathetic attitude towards sentiments of voters, who work at enterprises putting out products that compete with the cheaper imported ones, which undermine the economic well-being of quite a few Americans. But victory in elections is often brought about by just a few percentage points or even by fractions of one percent: don’t you remember the last presidential election?! Leaders of industries, which turn out insufficiently competitive, are actively lobbying in favor of protectionist and restrictive measures. In this respect the metallurgy is a typical example.

Q: How do you assess the new trend – the penetration of the U.S. economy by large Russian capital, for example, by such metallurgical companies as Norilsk Nickel and Severstal?

A: I believe that this is a positive phenomenon that contributes to the development of our strategic partnership. When 32 years ago I came to the U.S. for the first time, only the Russian vodka Stolichnaya and black caviar were known among Russian-made products in the American market. But visiting Washington recently I saw a LUKOIL gas station right in the center of the American capital. So far there are not too many examples of this kind but the strategy itself is a process that takes time. I witnessed how Japanese entered the American market and how China moved there the same way later on. Obviously, we also have to gradually take root in this market: to move stage by stage from goods of the ‘lower floors’, i.e. raw materials, to more technologically sophisticated and more expensive products.

Q: So, if we look at the prospects for the relations between Russia and the U.S. as a whole…

A: As I have already said, the fundamental barrier on the way to normalizing the Russian-American relations is the mutual distrust that still persists. Probably, solving these problems will require a long time and, most likely, they can be resolved only by new generations of politicians, who have never lived in those conditions, when Russia and the U.S. were getting prepared for a nuclear war against each other.
Establishing a strategic partnership is not an easy process. Solutions should be looked for not in the arms control area but in developing new forms of cooperation. To this end it is necessary, above all, to give up planning a nuclear war. But I am quite an optimist and I think that developing the strategy of a new partnership relationship is possible in the nearest 10 to 15 years. The potential for their establishment is available. The chief prerequisite is Russia’s key role on the Eurasian continent. The establishment of such a partnership between our countries would, obviously, contribute to forming a new, more just and humane world order.


Profile :
Sergei Rogov
Director,
the Institute of the USA and Canada Studies (Moscow), corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Born in Moscow in 1948. In 1971 graduated from the Moscow State Institute for Foreign Affairs. From 1972 to 1976 was a postgraduate at the Institute of the USA and Canada Studies. From 1976 till 1984 made a career at the Institute starting with the position of a junior research fellow. From 1984 to 1987 was the Institute’s representative at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. From 1987 to 1995 worked at the Institute in Moscow as a leading research fellow, chief of the department of the military and political studies and the Institute’s deputy director. Since 1995 has been the director of the Institute.
Authored over 300 articles as well as 16 books. Among them are ‘The Search for a Balance of Interests in the Soviet-American Relations’, ‘The Evolving Military Doctrine of Russia’, ‘Russian Foreign Policy: Three Years of Trial and Error’, ‘The Eurasian Strategy for Russia’, ‘The New Stage in Russian-American Relations’.